In this article an attempt is made to clarify the methods that form the basis of anthropological psychiatry. It appeared that especially the 'verstehende' psychology — worked out methodologically by Jaspers and divided into two concepts: 'statisch' and 'genetisch' — is very important for an understanding of the foundations of anthropological psychiatry. The phenomenology in the sense of descriptive psychology, underlies the 'Daseinanalyse' of Binswanger. 'Verstehen' in the sense of description was called 'statisch verstehen' by Jaspers; it requires the phenomenological psychiatrist to focus on the '... im bewusstsein wirklich vorfindbare' (what is actually met with in consiousness). 'Genetisch verstehen' is conceived here as understanding the connection of motives, for example someone is depressive 'because', without the conception of causality playing a part. Especially those feelings and ways of behavior which are conceived as being impossible to feel one's way into, induce two conceptions, namely 'causa' and 'Freie Existenz', which both determine the limits of the method of 'verstehen'. The Jatter is being criticized because in this conception man is conceived in an idealistic sense and in fact disappears as a subject for science, for Jaspers makes the 'Freie Existenz' a privilege for philosophers. Furthermore it is expounded how in 'Daseinanalyse' an attempt is made to found the supporting structure of an individual as 'Weltentwurf'. Following the 'Daseinanalyse', the anthropological psychiatry of Van der Horst is reviewed. In spite of the attempts to surmount the cartesian dualism, the results of Van der Horst's efforts imply a methodological dualism, because of the fundamental distinction he draws between biological and anthropological psychiatry. In daily life these two disciplines are indeed separated, but as a startingpoint for a consistent anthropological psychiatry this difficulty can be overcome.